We investigate how foreign aid dampens the effects of terrorism on FDI using interactive quantile regressions. The empirical evidence is based on 78 developing countries for the period 1984-2008. Bilateral and multilateral aid variables are used, while terrorism dynamics entail: domestic, unclear, transnational and total number of terrorist attacks. The main finding is that foreign aid cannot be used as a policy tool to effectively address a hypothetically negative effect of terrorism on FDI. The positive threshold we cannot establish is important for policy makers because it communicates a cut-off point at which foreign aid completely neutralizes the negative effect of terrorism on FDI. From the conditioning information set, we also establish for the most part that the effects of GDP growth, infrastructural development and trade openness are an increasing function of FDI. Policy implications are discussed.
Introduction
Over the past decade, political instability, conflicts and terrorism have considerably influenced foreign direct investment (FDI) location decisions to developing countries. Some recent examples of violent activities that have affected FDI location include: sabotage activities in Nigeria's oil Delta region by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (Obi, 2010; Onuoba, 2010; Akpan et al., 2013; Taylor, 2014) ; substantial disruptions of oil production in Libya in the post-Gaddafi era (Gaub, 2014) ; recent Al-Qaeda attacks in In Amenas of Algeria (Onyeji et al., 2014) and the control of many petroleum installations in Syria by the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) (Le Billon, 2015; Celso, 2015) . A number of solutions have been proposed in recent literature as means of preventing terrorism on the one hand and mitigating its negative externalities on economic development, on the other hand. These include: the importance of transparency (see Bell et al., 2015) ; the relevance of the rule of law (Choi, 2010) ; the role of educational channels (Brockhoff et al., 2014) like bilingualism (Costa et al., 2008) ; enhanced press freedom and publicity (Hoffman et al., 2013) ; the employment of military strategies and tactics (Feridun & Shahbaz, 2010) , behavioural investigations of attitudes towards terrorism (Gardner, 2007) , policy harmonization against terrorism (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2018; Asongu et al., 2018a) , the role of inclusive development, governance and military expenditure in fighting the scourge (Asongu et al., , 2018b and the relevance of foreign aid in mitigating the effect of terrorism on trade (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2017 ) and natural resources (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016 , 2017a .
To stem the activities of terrorist, and to sustain the flow of FDI into developing countries, recent studies have also been oriented towards the improvement of development assistance in reducing the potentially negative effect . Consistent with , the relevance of foreign aid in curbing the adverse consequences of terrorism on FDI in developing nations is a well-known convention. This consensus is motivated by the fact that countries that are affected by terrorism are economically poor and short of vital resources to fight the scourge . The authors maintain that the principal issue with terrorist activities in developing countries is that such countries have begun tailoring their foreign policy strategies to attract more foreign investment, and terrorist attack will be counter-productive to this goal.
Against this background, and Lee (2017) have established that developing assistance can mitigate this potentially counter-productive effect of terrorism in developing nations by providing the much needed finance to fight terrorist activities.
Whereas have extended and research by conditioning the mitigating role of development assistance on corruption-control levels in recipient countries, the present inquiry extends , and by assessing the role of foreign aid in mitigating the potentially negative effect of terrorism on FDI throughout the conditional distributions of FDI. Hence, for the purpose of comparison, we are consistent with the underlying studies in using a panel of 78 developing nations for the period . There are at least two other justifications for restricting the scope to developing countries: (i) the negative effects of terrorists' activities have been established to be relatively more apparent in developing countries, compared to developed nations which can absorb terrorists' activities without considerable negative externalities (Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2009 ) and (ii) the impact of development assistance to less developed countries is apparent especially with regards to creating hard and soft infrastructure for development. Enders and Sandler (1996) have established a negative effect from terrorism to foreign direct investment, while Blomberg and Mody (2005) have shown that violence in the perspectives of revolutions, wars and terrorism deter international investment and such a deterrent effect is mainly apparent in developing countries.
Focusing on foreign aid in mitigating the potentially negative effect of terrorism on FDI throughout the conditional distributions of FDI is important because of current global efforts towards sustaining external flows like FDI in developing countries (Asiedu, 2006; Asiedu & Lien, 2011; Apkan et al., 2014; Boly, et al., 2015) . In essence: (i) FDI is important in driving the growth needed to mitigate extreme poverty and (ii) it is important to fight terrorism in order to create an enabling environment for growth. A Quantile regression (QR) is employed as estimation strategy. This technique which assesses the relationship throughout the conditional distribution of FDI is contrary to and who have assessed the underlying nexuses at the mean values of FDI. Whereas mean values are important, corresponding findings have blanket policy implications because all countries are provided with the same policy prescription. This is different from the QR approach because a distinction is made between countries with low, intermediate and high initial levels of FDI. Given these insights, we argue that blanket policies are not likely to succeed unless they are contingent on existing levels of FDI and tailored differently across countries with low, intermediate and high levels of FDI.
The main finding is that foreign aid cannot be effectively used as a policy tool to effectively address a hypothetically negative effect of terrorism on FDI when considering the different FDI inflow levels across countries. The rest of the study is structured as follows: the review of the literature and theoretical underpinnings are discussed in Section 2, while.
Section 3 covers the data and methodology. The empirical results and policy implications are engaged in Section 4. Section 5 concludes with recommendations for future research.
Literature review and theoretical underpinnings
An important reason for desiring to stem the rise of terrorist activities is its devastating effect on global capital flow. There is a nascent body of literature (e.g. Humphreys, 2005; Koh, 2007; Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2008; Meierrieks & Gries, 2013; Choi, 2015) that have given extensive attention to estimating the economic value of terrorist attacks on foreign investors. It is observed that terrorist attacks cost an average developing country a significant amount of foreign direct investment, and this depends on the origin of the attack . This impact is significant for developing countries as the inflow of foreign investors is supposed to augment the prevalent resource gap from prevailing low savings, the declining state of development assistance, and poor integration of the region in the global capital market (Asiedu, 2006) . have extended and by conditioning the dampening role of foreign aid in the terrorism-FDI nexus across corruption-control levels in the recipient countries. The authors conclude that: (i) the negative impact of terrorism on FDI is only apparent in estimations with above-average corruption-control levels; (ii) development assistance dampens the negative impact of terrorism on FDI exclusively in countries with above-average corruption-control levels; (iii) the modifying role of bilateral aid on the effect of transnational terrorisms is consistent with . Moreover, the authors also find that the adverse impacts of unclear and total terrorism are mitigated by multilateral aid.
The above literature allows for improvement in at least two main areas: the need to incorporate more terrorism dynamics into the investigated relationships and the relevance of FDI conditionality. Considering the need for more dynamics of terrorism, Choi (2015) has established in the terrorism-growth literature that it is important to use a plethora of variables when investigating the nexus between terrorism and macroeconomic indicators. The author has shown that political instability variables have various effects across space and time.
Hence, we are consistent with in employing four terrorism indicators, namely: domestic, unclear, transnational and total terrorisms. Also, conditioning the assessed relationships on FDI levels may have relevant policy implications because blanket policies may be ineffective unless they are based on initial FDI levels, and are tailored distinctly across high-FDI and low-FDI developing countries. The empirical evidences motivating this intuition are the findings of Öcal and Yildirim (2010) which show that the effect of terrorism on economic prosperity depends on cross-regional initial levels of growth. The quantile regression empirical strategy adopted by this study is in accordance with this second contribution to the literature.
It is also important to briefly highlight the theoretical underpinnings on which the study is based. Our study is also consistent with Akinwale (2010, p. 125) Black (1990) , Thomas (1992) , Borg (1992) and Volkema and Bergmann (1995) .
The theoretical underpinnings converge with the present paper in the perspective that foreign aid is a policy variable that influences conditions articulated by the Social Control theory and Conflict Management Model. Accordingly, development assistance, among others, increases education, improves compliance with the rule of law, increases government expenditure and encourages social responsibility. For instance, Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) have established that terrorism decreases growth potentials by reducing government expenditure allocated for growth-enhancing investments. For brevity and lack of space, the interested reader can have more insights into other factors (respect for the rule of law, education and social responsibility) from the wealth of studies on political violence and instability (e.g. Heyneman, 2002; Beets, 2005; Heyneman, 2008a Heyneman, , 2008b Oreopoulos & Salvanes, 2009; Campos & Gassebner, 2013) . Given the above, the testable hypothesis of the present line of inquiry is as follows: we examine the role of foreign aid in mitigating a hypothetically negative effect of terrorism on FDI.
It is also important to articulate why different types of terrorism can affect FDI differently. This is essentially because four main types of terrorism are used in this study, namely: domestic terrorism, transnational terrorism, unclear terrorism and total terrorism. Consistent with Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014, p. 20) , we exclusively elucidate differences between domestic terrorism and transnational terrorism because of two main reasons. On the one hand, the theoretical underpinnings of unclear terrorism are difficult to ascertain. On the other hand, total terrorism is the sum of the three types of terrorism. theoretically demonstrate that when the impacts of transnational and domestic terror on FDI are compared, the deleterious effect from transnational terrorism is higher. This is essentially because the marginal effect associated with transnational terrorism is stronger given that domestic terrorism increases the foreign company's threat perception for the host country at a slower rate compared to transnational terrorism. The underlying inequality in responsiveness is more apparent when transnational groups are in pursuit of foreign investment which depicts the very notion behind transnational terror.
In the light of the above, the main objective of the study is to assess thresholds at which foreign aid mitigates the potentially negative effect of terrorism on FDI. Threshold within the context of this inquiry is a critical mass of foreign aid that is relevant for informing policy. Accordingly, a positive threshold is important for policy makers because it communicates a cut-off point at which foreign aid completely neutralizes the negative effect of terrorism on FDI. Hence, above this threshold, foreign aid interacts with terrorism to improve FDI. The establishment of a positive threshold requires a positive estimated effect from the interaction between the policy variable (foreign aid) and the policy syndrome (terrorism). Otherwise when the estimated interactive effect is negative, a negative threshold is more likely to be apparent. Such a conception and definition of threshold is in accordance with recent literature, notably: the need for a certain level in language proficiency before advantages in a second language are enjoyed (Cummins, 2000); a turning point for an appealing economic outcome (Roller & Waverman, 2001; Batuo, 2015) and requirements for Kuznets and U-shaped curves (Ashraf & Galor, 2013) .
Data and Methodology

Data
Consistent with and We employ two development assistance 'modifying variables' in the interactive regressions: multilateral and bilateral aid. The adopted control variables are: trade openness, GDP growth, inflation and infrastructural development. The choice of these dependent, independent, modifying and control variables are consistent with the underlying studies motivating this line of inquiry.
We now devote some space to briefly provide further justification for the choice of our variables. Development assistance provides economic resources, much needed for logistical
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The panel includes the following developing countries : "Albania, Costa Rica, India, Namibia, Syria, Algeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Tanzania, Angola, Dominican Republic, Iran, Niger, Thailand, Argentina, Ecuador, Jamaica, Nigeria, Togo, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, Trinidad and Tobago, Bangladesh, El Salvador, Kenya, Panama, Tunisia, Bolivia, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Papua New Guinea, Turkey, Botswana, Gabon, Libya, Paraguay, Uganda, Brazil, Gambia, Madagascar, Peru, Uruguay, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Malawi, Philippines, Venezuela, Cameroon, Guatemala, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, Chile, Guinea, Mali, Senegal, Yemen, China, Guinea-Bissau, Malta, Sierra Leone, Zambia, Colombia, Guyana ,Mexico, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Congo, D. Republic, Haiti, Morocco, Sri Lanka, Congo Republic, Honduras, Mozambique and Sudan". It is important to note that some countries may be more developed than others (e.g. Malta). Unfortunately, we are employing a dataset from and are leaving it unchanged for the purpose of comparing our findings with those of the underlying study.
and infrastructural investments in the fight against terrorism. Moreover, it may also create an enabling environment for decreasing political instability and non-violence by providing resources like human capital (Asiedu et al., 2009) . It follows that education; especially lifelong-learning can reduce the proportion of vulnerable citizens recruited for terrorist activities. The interest of decomposing aggregated foreign aid into its multilateral and bilateral components is to enable more options for policy implications (Asiedu & Nandwa, 2007; Johnson & Quartery, 2009; Asiedu, 2014; Efobi et al., 2014) 2 .
The choice of control variables are also in line with mainstream FDI literature (Asiedu, 2006; Asiedu & Lien, 2011 (Barrell & Pain, 1999) . Developing countries with better infrastructural development intuitively have an edge in attracting FDI owing to relatively lower transaction and production costs, ceteris paribus. We expect high inflation to reduce foreign investment prospects due to, inter alia: (i) a negative economic outlook and (ii) reducing purchasing power and domestic consumption. and . The purpose of Table 3 is to decrease potential issues of over-parameterization and multicollinearity that are articulated in bold. As expected, terrorism and foreign aid variables are highly correlated. Hence, we avoid employing two foreign aid or terrorism variables in the same specification. We also notice that while the dependent variable is negatively correlated with terrorism variables, it is also negatively (positively) correlated with bilateral (multilateral) aid. Whereas the negative correlation between FDI and bilateral aid is contrary to the intuition motivating the testable hypothesis enunciated in the introduction, however, two justifications motivate pursuing the line of inquiry. First, it is standard in econometrics that correlations should not be assimilated to causalities. Second, the bilateral aid variable is employed as a modifying policy variable. Hence, it could interact with terrorism to reveal other unexpected dynamics. 
Methodology
Consistent with the literature on conditional determinants (Billger & Goel, 2009) Previous studies on FDI determinants have reported estimated parameters at the conditional mean of FDI (Apkan et al., 2014; .
While mean impacts are important, we extend the underlying stream of literaure by employing QR to distinguish between initial levels of FDI. For example, while Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is based on the assumption that FDI and error terms are distributed normally, the QR approach is not founded on the hypothesis that error terms are normally distributed.
Hence, the techinque enables us to examine the impact of terrorism on FDI with particular emphasis on best-and worst-performing countries (in terms of FDI flow) among the sampled developing nations. In essence, with QR, parameter estimates are derived at multiple points of the conditional distributions of FDI (Koenker & Bassett, 1978) . The employed QR technique is increasingly being adopted in development literature, among others, in corruption studies (Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012) .
The  th quantile estimator of FDI is obtained by solving for the following optimization problem, which is presented without subscripts in Eq.
(1) for the purpose of simplicity and ease of presentation.
where   
where unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quantile. This formulation is analogous to Table 3 .
Empirical results
Presentation of results
The empirical findings presented in Table 4 and Table 5 respectively correspond to bilateral aid and multilateral aid regressions. Panel A (B) of both Tables presents findings for domestic and transnational (unclear and total) terrorisms. Consistent with the motivation discussed in the methodological section, an OLS baseline specification is provided to articulate modelling differences between conditional means and median values of FDI. Hence, the interest of adopting the QR technique is justified by differences in significance and magnitude of estimated coefficients between the OLS and QR results. In accordance with Brambor et al. (2006) , the overall effect of the modifying development assistance variable on the examined relationship is assessed in terms of marginal effects.
The following can be established for (0.011/0.002) and 9 (0.009/0.001) respectively for (i) and (ii).
The significant control variables have the expected signs. While the effect of inflation is consistently not significant, the other control variables consistently display increasing returns to foreign investment. Hence, the positive impact of GDP growth, infrastructure and trade increase from low to high quantiles of the FDI distributions. The increasing returns to FDI imply, the benefits of corresponding variables in stimulating FDI consistently increase with higher initial levels of FDI. In other words, the positive responsiveness of FDI to the variables increases with increasing levels of FDI. The following can be established for Table 5 on On the control variables, with the exception of GDP growth for which the evidence of positive increasing returns to FDI is not very apparent, their significances and magnitudes are broadly consistent with those established in Table 4 , notably: (i) the insignificant effect of inflation and (ii) evidence of increasing returns to FDI from the effects of trade openness and infrastructural development.
When the findings from Table 4 and Table 5 Constant -11.1*** -2.71*** -4.56*** -6.08*** -9.35*** -14.5*** -11.2*** -2.58*** -4.22*** -6.15*** -9.74*** -13.92*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) Domter 0.007** 0.001 0.004** 0.003 0.002 0.0007 
Further discussion of results and implication
We set-out to examine how foreign aid can be employed to mitigate the hypothetically negative influence of terrorism on FDI in developing countries. The findings have been mixed with expected and unexpected relationships. While we expected development assistance to boost FDI, the positive influence of terrorism on FDI is quite unexpected. With the slight exception of transnational terrorism on the RHS of Panel A in (Tull, 2006; De Grauwe et al., 2012) . It is important to devote some space to presenting our perspective of why the findings of bilateral aid are substantially different from those of multilateral aid. A possible elucidation for the difference is that, bilateral aid may be accompanied with more 'political economy' strings relative to multilateral aid (Efobi & Nnadi, 2015) . It makes sense to infer that bilateral aid is associated with more strings because, since it involves only two parties, a consensus on the strings to attach can easily be reached. Conversely, with multilateral aid, multiple donors with potentially very conflicting interests are involved. Whereas a recent literature survey has established no consistent evidence on the effectiveness of bilateral aid vis-à-vis multilateral aid in the development outcomes of recipient countries (Biscaye et al., 2015) , what is granted in our explanation is its consistency with common sense and evidence that bilateral aid to former colonies (from former colonial powers) is strongly tailored in view of preserving colonial legacies and strategic interests. Accordingly, evidence of positive increasing returns to FDI established in our findings may be due to conflicting strategic interests of multilateral donors which may indulge the donors to allocate aid essentially on FDI development outcomes.
A third issue of contention from our findings is that, interactions between terrorism and foreign aid dynamics unexpectedly yield negative effects on FDI. This is visible exclusively in bottom quantiles of FDI distributions. Notably, this tendency is apparent in interactions between: (i) bilateral aid and domestic terrorism in bottom quantiles, (ii) multilateral aid and domestic terrorism in the 25 th quartile and (iii) multilateral aid and transnational terrorism for the bottom quantiles. Moreover, we also notice that on average, the threshold value for bilateral aid (5.5) is higher than those for multilateral aid (4.00, 3.13 and 3.90). This implies, more bilateral aid is needed to change the positive effect of domestic terrorism on FDI relative to the amount of multilateral aid needed to reverse the positive gains of domestic and transnational terrorisms on FDI.
Drawing from the literature, a possible elucidation for the negative interactive dynamic could be traceable to the political economy of development assistance because some aid categories, allocated for the fight against terrorism, may be inconsistent with the intended purposes of fighting terrorism. This is even more likely when the policy initiative is not substantiated with an established negative effect of terrorism on FDI. It is also important to note that foreign aid allocated to boost government revenue in the fight against terrorism may not have an incremental effect on overall government income because recent literature has established that overly reliance on foreign aid could reduce domestic tax incomes and hence:
(i) less political accountability and representation, and (ii) more political instability and violence. This narrative is consistent with Eubank (2012) on Somaliland. Therefore, as a policy implication, it is relevant to have insights into the initial or underlying impact of terrorism on FDI before allocating foreign aid to mitigate a 'potentially negative effect' which in real terms, may be 'positive'. While the discussion of results could read as quite uncritical of international/multilateral aid, it is interesting to note that there are also political biases, which might be, nevertheless, not as rampant for bilateral aid.
Conclusion, caveat and future research directions
This study has extended the literature on nexuses between foreign aid, terrorism and FDI by assessing the role of foreign aid on the potentially negative effect of terrorism on FDI.
Using Though not uncommon in the quantile regressions literature (see Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012) , the main caveat of the study is that we have not controlled for decomposing foreign aid into more components and (v) accounting for regional heterogeneity in the examined nexuses.
